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NOTES
THE CONFLICT OVER RICO'S PRIVATE TREBLE
DAMAGES ACTION
INTRODUCTION
On three successive days inJuly 1984, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit issued decisions' circumscribing the private civil
action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO).2 RICO allows a private plaintiff to recover treble dam-
ages and reasonable attorney's fees for injuries to business or prop-
erty "by reason of a violation" of the Act's substantive prohibitions. 3
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 4 the most important of the decisions,
the Second Circuit imposed two limitations on the civil RICO ac-
tion. First, the court imposed a standing requirement under which
the plaintiff must allege a racketeering injury, and not merely an in-
1 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105
S. Ct. 901 (1985); Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984),petition for
cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3367 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1984) (No. 84-654). But see Furman v. Cirrito,
741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984) (panel refused to follow approach taken in Sedima and Bank-
ers Trust), petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1984).
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). Section 1962 contains RICO's substantive
prohibitions. Section 1962(a) prohibits use of income derived from a pattern of racke-
teering activity to acquire or establish an enterprise affecting interstate commerce. Civil
RICO plaintiffs usually bring their claims under §§ 1962(b) and 1962(c):
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racke-
teering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enter-
prise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt.
Section 1964(c) provides for a private treble damages action. It states:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a viola-
tion of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he
sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Because §§ 1964(a) and 1964(b) give the United States the right to sue for divesti-
ture, dissolution, reorganization, or injunctive relief, the term "civil RICO" may refer to
§ 1964 in its entirety. For the purposes of this Note, however, the term "civil RICO"
will refer to the private right of action under § 1964(c), unless otherwise indicated.
3 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
4 741 F.2d at 482.
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jury resulting directly from the predicate illegal acts themselves.5
Second, the court created a prior criminal conviction requirement.
Under this requirement, the defendant must have been previously
convicted of the illegal activities alleged to constitute the pattern of
racketeering activity.6
The Second Circuit's recent decisions restrict the private civil
RICO action to a degree unprecedented at the federal appellate
level. Although many federal courts have noted the recent "explo-
sion of civil RICO litigation,"7 they have not agreed on the proper
judicial response.8 In an opinion expressly rejecting the Sedima
court's reasoning, for example, the Seventh Circuit recently refused
to place judicial limitations on RICO's plain language, despite the
increasing tendency to apply RICO to typical business and securities
fraud cases. 9 In Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co. 10
the Seventh Circuit concluded that any restrictions of the private
civil RICO action should be made, if at all, by Congress." The
United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Sedima and
Haroco to resolve the present conflict. 12
After briefly summarizing RICO's provisions and legislative his-
tory, this Note examines Sedima and Haroco. It then analyzes a
number of suggested civil RICO limitations and outlines the judicial
responses to each.
5 Id. at 494-95. The predicate illegal acts are listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (1982).
See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
6 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496.
7 See id. at 486.
8 The Seventh Circuit in Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747
F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 902 (1985), expressly rejected both
Sedima and Bankers Trust. The Seventh Circuit had previously refused to place standing
limitations on civil RICO plaintiffs. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1356-57 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508, 509 (1983). The court held in Schacht that "we do not
see how any legitimate or principled tailoring of RICO could be effected without impair-
ing the broad strategy embodied in the act." 711 F.2d at 1356. Even the Second Circuit
is sharply divided on the racketeering injury issue. Compare Furman, 741 F.2d at 525
("neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history imposes such a require-
ment") with Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494-95 (imposing such a limitation).
The Seventh Circuit has also rejected the requirement of a prior criminal convic-
tion. See Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1287 (7th
Cir. 1983). The Sixth Circuit has supported this position. See USACO Coal Co. v.
Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982) ("Congress has created a
civil remedy that is independent of criminal proceedings under § 1963.").
9 Haroco, 747 F.2d at 384.
1O 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 902 (1985).
11 Id. at 392, 399.
12 105 S. Ct. at 901, 902.
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I
THE RICO STATUTE
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, be-
came jaw on October 14, 1970. RICO prohibits four activities by
any person: using income derived directly or indirectly from a pat-
tern of racketeering activity to acquire an interest in an enterprise
engaged in or affecting interstate commerce;13 directly or indirectly
acquiring or maintaining an interest in an interstate enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity; 14 conducting or partici-
pating in the conduct of the affairs of an interstate enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity; 15 or conspiring to violate
any of these provisions. 16
Congress vaguely defined RICO's rather amorphous terms in
18 U.S.C. § 1961. The predicate racketeering activities set forth in
section 1961(1) include various felonies under state law as well as
federal offenses, including mail, wire, and securities fraud. 17 Sec-
tion 1961(4) defines "enterprise" to include any individual, legal en-
tity, or any group of individuals "associated in fact." The Supreme
Court in United States v. Turkette18 broadly construed "enterprise" to
include wholly illegitimate businesses as well as legitimate concerns
infiltrated by organized crime. 19 Section 1961(5) defines "pattern
of racketeering activity" to require at least two acts of racketeering
activity, the first occurring after RICO's effective date and the last
occurring within ten years of the first. Turkette emphasized that the
plaintiff must prove both the existence of an enterprise and a pat-
tern of racketeering activity as separate elements of RICO. 20
RICO provides for three types of remedies: injunctive and re-
strictive relief;21 criminal penalties;22 and damages through a pri-
13 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982).
14 Id. § 1962(b).
15 Id. § 1962(c).
16 Id. § 1962(d).
17 "Racketeering activity" includes any "act which is indictable" as mail fraud, id.
§ 1341, or wire fraud, id. § 1343; see id. § 1961(1)(B). These are the predicate crimes
commonly relied on in business fraud cases. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) includes as a racke-
teering activity "any offense involving. . . fraud in the sale of securities." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1)(A) also includes various state felonies as racketeering activities.
Section 1961 also contains several definitions of terms used in § 1962 ("Prohibited
activities"). See infra text accompanying notes 18-20.
18 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
19 Id. at 580-93. RICO's application to legitimate enterprises infiltrated by organ-
ized crime was established before Turkette. See, e.g., United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d
1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978) (Pennsylvania Bureau of Cigarette
and Beverages Taxes qualified as RICO enterprise).
20 See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
21 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
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vate right of action to "[a]ny person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter." 23
Section 1964(c) provides for the recovery of treble damages plus
reasonable attorney's fees. 24 The language of this private civil rem-
edy is borrowed from section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act.25
Congress designed RICO as a broad measure to alleviate the ill
effects of organized crime on the economy and society. Congress
proposed to "eradicat[e] . . . organized crime in the United States
by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of
those engaged in organized crime." 26 Congress recognized that
profits derived from illegal endeavors "are increasingly used to infil-
trate and corrupt legitimate business" and that organized crime's
activities "weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system,
harm innocent investors and competing organizations, [and] inter-
fere with free competition." 27 Congress was concerned not only
with the economic effects of organized crime, but also with its dele-
terious effects on democratic processes, domestic security, and the
general welfare. 28 Congress mandated that "[t]he provisions of
[RICO] shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes. '"29
II
THE CASES
Two cases recently decided in the Second and Seventh Circuits
illustrate the judicial conflict concerning the scope of RICO's civil
remedy. In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,3 0 a panel of the Second Cir-
22 Id. § 1964(b).
23 Id. § 1964(c). Section 1964(d) estops a defendant convicted of a criminal RICO
violation "from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in [a] subse-
quent civil proceeding brought by the United States."
24 Id. § 1964(c).
25 The Clayton Act contains a private right of action almost identical in language to
that of RICO. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982). See also Organized Crime Control. Hearings on S.
30 Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 543-44
(1970) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings] (testimony of ABA president Edward L.
Wright) (discussing borrowing of Clayton Act language); id. at 548 (ABA proposal for
private damage provision based upon concept of § 4 of Clayton Act).
26 18 U.S.C. § 1961 note (1982) (congressional Statement of Findings and Pur-
poses). See generally Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1014-21 (1980)
(tracing RICO's legislative history).
27 18 U.S.C. § 1961 note (Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose).
28 Id.; see Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516 n.6 (2d Cir. 1984),
petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3367 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1984) (No. 84-654).
29 18 U.S.C. § 1961 note (1982) (liberal construction provision).
30 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 901 (1985).
19851 905
CORNELL LA4 W REVIEW
cuit adopted a narrowing approach to the civil remedy. In Haroco,
Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co.,3 1 the Seventh Circuit re-
jected the Sedima court's opinion and gave the RICO civil action a
broad reading. The cases typify alternative positions now taken in
the debate over civil RICO: one position advocating a narrowing
construction, the other a broad reading of the statute. A critical ex-
amination of each opinion's reasoning therefore provides a strong
basis for resolving the more general conflict over the proper scope
of civil RICO.
B. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Company, Inc.
Sedima involved typical business fraud. The plaintiff, Sedima,
imported electronic parts from the defendant-exporter, Imrex, for a
NATO subcontractor. Sedima alleged that Imrex's officers had pre-
pared fraudulent business orders and invoices. Sedima also alleged
that Imrex's officers fraudulently received money belonging to the
Sedima-Imrex joint venture. Sedima joined breach of contract and
unjust enrichment counts with claims under RICO. The district
court dismissed the RICO claims for failure to allege a "RICO-type
injury." 32 The Second Circuit affirmed, requiring the plaintiff to al-
lege, first, a "racketeering injury," and, second, the defendant's
prior criminal conviction of the predicate acts constituting the pat-
tern of racketeering activity. 33
The majority opinion in Sedima ultimately rests on the view that
"[g]iven the general purpose of the RICO legislation, the uses to
which private civil RICO has been put have been extraordinary, if
not outrageous." 34 The majority determined that Congress did not
anticipate RICO's use for "garden variety" fraud and surmised that
Congress would have discussed this use in greater depth had it been
contemplated. 35
The majority in Sedima began their analysis with a review of the
Act's legislative history. They emphasized that because the House
added the private civil action under RICO after the bill left the Sen-
ate, the legislative history of RICO in the Senate could not shed any
light on the private civil action. The majority found little commen-
tary on the civil action in the records of the House proceedings.
Form the dearth of specific legislative history, they concluded that
"Congress was not aware of the possible implications of section
31 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 902 (1985).
32 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 485. See infra notes 160-86 and accompanying text.
33 Id. at 496.
34 Id. at 487.
35 Id. at 492.
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1964(c) [the private civil action]."3 6
In order to counter the unanticipated explosion of civil RICO
cases and follow imputed legislative intent, the majority imposed a
limitation on the private action: the racketeering injury require-
ment. The court stated that the language of the civil RICO provi-
sions, requiring an injury "by reason of a violation" of RICO's
substantive prohibitions, implicitly mandated "that plaintiffs allege
injury caused by an activity which RICO was designed to deter."37
The majority sought to rebut two arguments against imposing a
racketeering injury requirement. First, the court conceded that,
although RICO's civil remedy is patterned after section 4 of the
Clayton Act, which requires the plaintiff to prove a "competitive in-
jury," s38 Congress probably did not intend to impose the full pano-
ply of antitrust standing requirements on prospective civil RICO
litigants.3 9 The majority nevertheless argued for an "analogous
standing barrier. . . to RICO"-the requirement of a "racketeering
injury." 40 Second, the majority attempted to counter the contention
that the term "racketeering injury" could not be precisely defined.
The court sought to distinguish a racketeering injury from a
"competitive injury." 4 1 According to the majority, a racketeering
injury is an "injury different in kind from that occurring as a result
of the predicate acts themselves, or not simply caused by the predi-
cate acts, but also caused by an activity which RICO was designed to
deter." 42 Though disavowing an antitrust competitive injury re-
quirement, the Sedima majority would require the plaintiff in a civil
RICO action to demonstrate activity by "mobsters" that causes
"systemic harm to competition and the market, and thereby in-
jure[s] investors and competitors. '" 43
36 Id. at 492; see infra note 88 (improper to derive positive conclusion from silence
in legislative history); see also infra note 119 (probable Senate awareness of inclusion of
private treble damages action).
37 See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494.
38 See id. at 494-96, 496 n.41; infra note 41.
39 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 495 ("It would no doubt violate both the congressional pur-
pose and common sense to require RICO plaintiffs to allege an injury of the type the
antitrust laws were designed to prevent to maintain a RICO suit.") (emphasis in original).
40 Id. (emphasis omitted) ("By borrowing language [from § 4 of the Clayton Act]
imposing a standing limitation, it is reasonable to believe that Congress indicated a de-
sire to have an analogous standing limitation imposed in RICO." (footnote omitted)).
41 The "competitive injury" requirement is an antitrust standing limitation focusing
on market efficiency rather than business injury. See id. at 496 n.41 (citing Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977)).
42 Id. at 496. This definition derives partially from analogy to the Supreme Court's
definition of an "antitrust injury" as an "injury of the type the antitrust laws were in-
tended to prevent." See id. at 494-95 (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)).
43 Id. at 495-96.
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In Sedima the Second Circuit also imposed a prior criminal con-
viction requirement. The court began its analysis by summarily dis-
missing most of the contrary case law as containing "little or no
analysis." 44 The majority then analyzed the statutory language.
First, they compared the language of RICO's private right of action
with that of the private civil action under the Clayton Act45 and sug-
gested that "violation" in RICO means "conviction," because "vio-
lation" is not used in the Clayton Act, where no prior conviction is
required.46 The majority next looked to RICO's definition of "rack-
eteering activity," 47 focusing on the words "act or threat," "indicta-
ble [acts]," and "offense." '48 They noted that "[a]ll these terms...
speak along criminal rather than civil lines." 49 Moreover, Congress
could not have "intended to permit proof of 'willful' violations by
only a preponderance of the evidence" in the securities fraud con-
text.50 A civil burden of proof, the majority argued, would create a
constitutional problem, because
[r]eading private RICO suits not to require criminal convictions
would provide civil remedies for offenses criminal in nature, stig-
matize defendants with the appellation "racketeer," authorize the
award of damages which are clearly punitive, including attorney's
fees, and constitute a civil remedy aimed in part to avoid the con-
stitutional protections of the criminal law. 5i
This interpretation would make "every private plaintiff. . . his own
one-person grand jury."52
Second, the majority discussed legislative intent. After conced-
ing that the statute's words "are ambiguous and could be construed
to relate to underlying conduct," the court decided that Congress
intended RICO to punish only conduct "which explicitly has already
been found criminal." 53 Because such conduct cannot be proven in
44 Id. at 496. The majority distinguished United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975), on the ground that that case dealt with
the government's right to sue for an injunction in the absence of a criminal conviction.
See infra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
45 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 498-99. RICO provides a right of action for any person in-
jured in his business or property "by reason of a violation of § 1962." 18 U.S.C.
1964(c). The Clayton Act grants a right of action to a person injured "by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
46 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 498-99. But see Victims of Crime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 329
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Victims of Crime] (American Law Division of Library of Con-
gress rejecting this reading of "violation"); infra note 208 and accompanying text.
47 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
48 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 499.
49 Id.
50 Id. See infra note 214.
5i Sedima, 741 F.2d at 500 n.49.
52 Id. at 500.
53 Id.
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a civil trial, the majority reasoned that a criminal conviction must
precede the civil trial.54
Judge Cardamone vehemently dissented in Sedima. He rejected
the majority's imposition of a "racketeering injury" standing re-
quirement. He criticized the vagueness of the term and noted the
difficulty of distinguishing between injury caused by the predicate
acts and that caused "'by reason of conduct the RICO act was
designed to prevent.' "55 He asserted that the majority's limitation
is really nothing more than a "euphemism for an 'organized crime'
nexus requirement." 56 The Second Circuit and other courts have
overwhelmingly rejected a nexus requirement of this type.57 Judge
Cardamone argued that Congress intended "[t]o cast a net suffi-
ciently wide to catch organized criminals."5 8 He also warned that a
racketeering injury requirement would exclude many cases that
Congress surely would have chosen to include within civil RICO's
scope 59 and asserted that any limitation on civil RICO actions
should come from Congress, not the courts.60
Judge Cardamone also criticized the majority for intruding into
the congressional sphere by promulgating a prior criminal convic-
tion requirement. Judge Cardamone countered the majority's
"drastic redrafting of the statute" on several grounds. 6t First, the
judge relied on a case which the majority had distinguished, United
States v. Cappetto.6 2 The Cappetto court ruled that Congress has the
power to use civil proceedings to prohibit activities that it finds ad-
versely affect interstate commerce. Congress must also have power,
Cardamone argued, to utilize private plaintiffs as "private attor-
ney[s] general" to effectuate its prohibitions.65
Second, Cardamone stated that the "chargeable" and "indicta-
54 Id. at 501-02.
55 Id. at 509 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority).
56 Id.
57 The Second Circuit rejected the requirement that a civil RICO plaintiff allege a
nexus to organized crime in Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 n.17 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984). See also infra notes 136-41 and accompanying
text.
58 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 510 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 504.
62 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). In Cappetto the
government brought a RICO action against defendants accused of operating an illegal
gambling operation. The court rejected the defendants' argument that an action under
civil RICO was essentially a criminal proceeding and that consequently their constitu-
tional rights were being abridged. Id. at 1356.
63 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 504-05 (CardamoneJ., dissenting). See also I MATERIALS ON
RICO 53-54 (R. Blakey ed. 1980) (explaining that private civil RICO action is method
for understaffed organized crime programs to "enlist the resources of the private bar").
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ble" language in RICO clearly does not require the actual return of
an information or indictment, noting that section 1964 is entitled
"Civil Remedies" and not "Post Criminal Conviction Civil Reme-
dies." 64 Cardamone added that the "use of criminal and civil sanc-
tions for the same conduct is common," and that treble damages are
not inherently criminal sanctions. 65 The judge further argued that
the majority overlooked the common use of the word "violation" to
designate civil wrongs. 66
Third, Cardamone cited United States v. Ward67 as authority for
using a two-step test to classify a statute as civil or criminal: whether
Congress has indicated a preference for one label or another; and, if
Congress has preferred the civil label, whether the statute is so pu-
nitive in purpose or effect as to negate the intention.6 He con-
cluded that, under the Ward test, section 1964(c) is "primarily
remedial, and only partly punitive." 69 Judge Cardamone argued
further that even if section 1964 lacks some of the constitutional
safeguards required when a statute creates a "quasi-criminal" sanc-
tion, "the proper course is not to require a prior criminal convic-
tion, but to insist on the application of those safeguards . . . within
the context of a civil proceeding." 70
64 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 505 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
65 Id. See infra notes 237-62 and accompanying text.
66 Id. at 508. The Seventh Circuit has rejected the contention that "violation"
means "conviction" in civil RICO. Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc.,
713 F.2d 1271, 1287 (7th Cir. 1983). See infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
67 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
68 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 506-07 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 507 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 506. Judge Cardamone also dissented in the second case of the trilogy,
Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), a bankruptcy fraud case.
Bankers Trust treated only the racketeering injury issue. The panel held that the conduct
causing a RICO plaintiff's injury must result not only from two or more predicate acts
(the pattern of racketeering activity), but also from "the use of that pattern to invest in,
control, or conduct, a RICO enterprise." Id. at 516. The pattern, and not only the
predicate acts, must cause the.injury. For example, where a plaintiff is victimized by
multiple acts of arson, is consequently unable to obtain fire insurance, and subsequently
suffers innocent fire damage, he may recover for that innocent damage. Id. at 517.
Judge Cardamone in dissent criticized the Bankers Trust holding as unjustifiably restrict-
ing recovery to those plaintiffs who are injured indirectly by RICO activities. Id. at 522-
23 (CardamoneJ., dissenting). The Seventh Circuit in Haroco felt that the Bankers Trust
holding was even more restrictive than Sedima's. See 747 F.2d at 395-97.
In the final decision of the trilogy, Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984), a
third Second Circuit panel dismissed a RICO complaint because it was bound by the
earlier decisions in Sedima and Bankers Trust. The panel nonetheless found no justifica-
tion for a racketeering injury requirement in RICO's language or legislative history.
The panel found that Congress did not intend to limit RICO's application to "hoodlums
and thugs." Id. at 528. Sedima's racketeering injury limitation, the panel asserted, would
"sterilize civil RICO as a weapon against the conduct congress sought to curtail." Id. at
529. The panel felt that any restrictions on civil RICO should come from Congress and
not the judiciary. Id. at 533.
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B. Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank and Trust Company of
Chicago
In Haroco,7 1 the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its refusal to judi-
cially limit access by private plaintiffs to civil RICO's potent reme-
dies. The plaintiffs in Haroco were businesses that borrowed money
from the defendant, American National Bank and Trust Company of
Chicago (ANB), at an interest rate of one percent over ANB's prime
rate. Plaintiffs alleged that ANB defrauded them in calculating the
prime rate. Dismissing the complaint, the district court held that "a
plaintiffs injury to be cognizable under RICO must be caused by a
RICO violation and not simply by the commission of predicate of-
fenses, such as acts of mail fraud."' 72 The Seventh Circuit reversed
the district court's judgment. 73
The Haroco panel noted that both courts adopting and those
rejecting a racketeering injury requirement claimed support from
RICO's plain language. The court therefore decided to "do more
than stare at the language of section 1964(c) [the private civil ac-
tion] to decide this issue." 74 The court first demonstrated that
"Congress deliberately chose the very broad language of RICO's
provisions," at least in part "to avoid creating loopholes for clever
defendants and their lawyers."' 75 The panel then reaffirmed the Sev-
enth Circuit's position rejecting various standing limitations. In re-
jecting a competitive injury limitation, the panel stated that
"[r]estrictive standing requirements analogous to those in antitrust
laws would too often leave those [illegal] gains in the hands of the
RICO violators."' 76 The panel found that courts had "thoroughly
repudiated" the idea of imposing an organized crime nexus require-
ment.77 The court also decried any attempt to limit RICO's availa-
bility to only indirect victims of racketeering activity, again
emphasizing RICO's purpose of stripping profits from RICO viola-
tors, even in cases of direct injury from predicate acts. 78 The panel
71 747 F.2d at 384.
72 Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 577 F. Supp. 111, 114 (N.D.
Ill. 1983), rev'd, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 902 (1985).
73 Haroco, 747 F.2d at 405.
74 Id. at 389.
75 Id. at 390.
76 Id. at 391 n.8 (citing In re Catanella & E.F. Hutton & Co., 583 F.Supp. 1388,
1433-34 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (noting that small grocer forced to pay protection money would
have no redress against racketeer under competitive injury limitation)). See also infra
notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
77 Haroco, 747 F.2d at 391. See also infra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
78 Id. at 391-92. The court was responding to the "indirect injury" argument. Pro-
ponents of this argument assert that Congress did not intend RICO to provide a remedy
to those injured directly by predicate acts of racketeering activity because direct injuries
may be compensable under preexisting causes of action. See infra notes 176-86 and ac-
companying text; infra note 84.
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held that even if Congress did not fully anticipate civil RICO's po-
tential uses, "it provided few if any textual pegs which could permit
courts to develop reasoned, consistent and principled limits without
simply redrafting the statute."' 79
The Haroco court next examined the Second Circuit's new defi-
nition of the racketeering injury limitation,8 0 which it found to be
"only a composite of the various proposed standing or injury limits"
previously rejected in the Seventh Circuit.81 The Haroco panel de-
scribed the Sedima court's essential error as mistaking a deliberately
broad statute for an ambiguous one.82 After reviewing Sedima, the
panel found that "Sedima ha[d] revived the discredited 'organized
crime nexus' requirement without quite saying so,"83 and "blended
elements of competitive injury and indirect injury into its racketeer-
ing injury requirement." 84 According to the Seventh Circuit in
Haroco, civil RICO's "by reason of" language "simply imposes a
proximate cause requirement on plaintiffs." 85 The court concluded
that "Congress appears to have preferred a broad statute, even if
overinclusion might result." 86 The panel also supported a civil stan-
dard of proof despite the Sedima court's warnings that such a stan-
dard created constitutional problems.87
III
ANALYSIS
The Second Circuit's decision in Sedima unreasonably limits the
79 Haroco, 747 F.2d at 392.
80 See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
81 Haroco, 747 F.2d at 393. The panel referred to the decision in Schacht v. Brown,
711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 509 (1983). Schacht involved the defend-
ant's fraudulent concealment and exacerbation of an insurance corporation's actual in-
solvency, causing the corporation's parent to continue operating the insurance
corporation to the parent's detriment. The Schacht court, although generally disapprov-
ing of limitations on RICO, did not reach the racketeering injury issue. In Schacht, it was
clear that a pattern of racketeering activity injured the plaintiffs and not merely the pred-
icate acts of fraud. The Schacht court rejected, however, any "attenuated 'but for' causa-
tion" requirement for § 1964(c), the type of causation that Bankers Trust apparently
imposed. See 711 F.2d at 1359; infra notes 176-86 and accompanying text.
82 Haroco, 747 F.2d at 398.
83 Id. at 394; see infra notes 131-52 and accompanying text.
84 Haroco, 747 F.2d at 395. An "indirect injury" does not result directly from the
acts of fraud. For example, fraud indirectly injures an arson victim that cannot obtain
fire insurance as a result of the fraud. Schacht rejected an indirect injury requirement.
See 711 F.2d at 1358.
85 Haroco, 747 F.2d at 398.
86 Id. at 399. The Seventh Circuit emphasized its deference to Congress's policy
decision to cast a broad net of liability in order to adequately discourage organized
crime. Against this congressional policy, the Haroco court weighed "much smaller
stakes-legal fees and the sensibilities of prominent defendants alleged to be 'racke-
teers.'" Id. (footnote omitted).
87 Id. at 404; see supra text accompanying note 51.
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availability of civil RICO actions to private plaintiffs. The Second
Circuit read ambiguity into an intentionally broad statute to justify
imposing restrictions on civil RICO that Congress never intended.
As the Seventh Circuit in Haroco stated, courts should accord civil
RICO the broad scope which the statute's language and legislative
history require.
A. Congressional Intent
The issue of congressional intent8 8 lies at the core of the judi-
cial debate regarding the scope of RICO. Sedima represents a prime
example of an improper judicial reading of RICO's legislative his-
tory to justify the imposition of various limitations on the civil rem-
edy's scope. Before proceeding to discuss these limitations, it is
therefore necessary to consider the inaccuracies in several views of
the legislative history advanced by courts to justify a narrowing ap-
proach. The courts have focused on three areas of disputable con-
gressional intent: the federalization of traditionally state-law
offenses, the duplication of preexisting remedies, and the foresee-
ability of RICO's potential for abuse.
1. Federalization of State Law
Several courts have justified narrowing RICO by suggesting, al-
beit inaccurately, that Congress did not mean the statute to federal-
ize issues traditionally covered by state law.89 Congress recognized,
88 The majority in Sedima emphasized the "clanging silence" of the legislative his-
tory in justifying their narrowing approach. 741 F.2d at 492. They assumed that if Con-
gress had intended the private civil RICO action to have a broad sweep then it would
have at least mentioned the matter. Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, have
suggested that the plain language of a statute provides a better indication of legislative
intent than do any conclusions drawn from congressional silence relating to a specific
legal question. In Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981), the Court considered
the question of whether a court could impose consecutive sentences for conspiracy to
import and distribute controlled substances. The Court found the legislative history to
be silent on this question: "Petitioners read this silence as an 'ambiguity' over whether
Congress intended to authorize multiple punishment. Petitioners, however, read much
into nothing. Congress cannot be expected to specifically address each issue of statu-
tory construction which may arise." Id. at 340-41 (footnote omitted). See also Standefer
v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 20 n.12 (1980) (petitioner's argument, that Congress's
failure to mention a certain common law rule in a committee report showed its intent to
abrogate the rule, "would permit an omission in the legislative history to nullify the
plain meaning of a statute"); Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 447 U.S. 578, 592 (1980) ("it
would be a strange canon of statutory construction that would require Congress to state
in committee reports or elsewhere in its deliberations that which is obvious on the face
of a statute").
89 See, e.g., Sedima, 741 F.2d at 486 ("an expansive interpretation of RICO allows
plaintiffs to bring into federal courts many claims formerly subject only to state jurisdic-
tion"); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (D.
Mass. 1982) ("We do not believe Congress intended § 1964(c) to afford a remedy to
every consumer who could trace purchase of a product to a violation of § 1962. ...
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however, that RICO federalized large areas of traditionally state law.
During debates Representative Ekhardt criticized RICO's "over-
loading of the Federal courts by moving large substantive areas [of
law] formerly totally within the police power of the State into the
Federal realm." 90 Representative Mikva warned that "[w]hat we
have done in one fell swoop .. .is to incorporate as a part of the
Federal Law all of the offenses which heretofore have traditionally
been treated as under State and local jurisdictions."91 Nevertheless,
Congress refused to circumscribe RICO and included mail and wire
fraud in the statute's substantive provisions.
A number of federal courts agree that Congress intended RICO
to federalize large areas of state law. The United States Supreme
Court, in United States v. Turkette,92 recognized this as the congres-
sional intent and rejected the argument, which the Sedima majority
found persuasive, that such a shift in federal-state responsibility was
impermissible. In Turkette, the Court reasoned that Congress was
within its authority when it created the broadly inclusive civil rem-
edy and found that "the courts are without authority to restrict the
application of the statute."193 The Court broadly construed the stat-
ute even though amici argued that "[u]nless the lower court opinion
is affirmed, the federal judicial system will be faced with an invasion
of garden variety commercial disputes masquerading as civil RICO
claims." 94 In Schacht v. Brown,95 the Seventh Circuit also noted the
substantial change RICO effects in the federal-state division of re-
sponsibility for redressing illegal conduct, but agreed that "such
Such an interpretation would open the federal courts to frequent RICO treble damage
claims by federalizing much consumer protection law and by inviting plaintiffs to append
RICO claims for consumer fraud to nonfederal claims thereby achieving treble damage
recovery and a federal forum."); North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp.
207, 210 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (holding in case involving fraud in inducement of real estate
development contract that "the purpose of § 1964(c) was not to transform state law
violations into federal violations, but to prevent interference with free competition").
90 116 CONG. REC. 35217 (1970). Representative Eckhardt's comments referred to
S.30, which involved the government's right to civil actions, but not the private civil
action.
91 Id. at 35205.
92 452 U.S. 576 (1981). Turkette involved a criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(d) (1982) for various illegal acts, including drug trafficking, arson, mail fraud,
and bribery.
93 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587.
94 Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling,"
19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 655, 673 (1981) (quoting Brief for the Boston Bar Ass'n & Mass.
Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Amici Curiae at 22-23, United States v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576 (1981) ("The most mundane state tort suits could be brought in to federal
court pendant to a RICO claim. . . . The reputations of companies and individuals
having no conceivable connection to organized crime will be sullied. And there will be
no United States Attorneys' Manual to limit the discretion of private attorneys bringing
RICO actions.")) [hereinafter cited as "Everybody's Darling"].
95 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 104 S. Ct. 509 (1983).
[Vol. 70:902914
19851 RICO TREBLE DAMAGES 915
dramatic consequences are necessary incidents of the deliberately
broad swath Congress chose to cut in order to reach the evil it
sought."'96 The Schacht court noted with approval the Eighth Cir-
cuit's holding in Bennett v. Berg9 7 that federalizing state claims was
"not unanticipated" by Congress. 98
2. Duplication of Remedies
Closely related to the federalization of state law issue is the con-
tention that Congress did not intend to duplicate already existing
remedies by enacting RICO.99 This argument has enjoyed particu-
lar favor in the securities fraud area. 100 For example, in Harper v.
New Japan Securities International, 10 1 the plaintiff alleged that the de-
fendants had churned her custodial account, a violation of the fed-
eral securities laws. The Harper court refused to allow the plaintiff
to maintain her civil RICO action, finding it "simply incomprehensi-
ble that a plaintiff suing under the securities laws would receive one-
third the damages of a plaintiff suing under RICO for the same in-
jury."' 0 2 In Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 103 a
96 Id. at 1353. In Schacht the Illinois Department of Insurance brought a RICO
claim against an insurance company's officers and directors who allegedly operated the
business past the point of insolvency. The Schacht court was responding to the argument
that allowing such an action to proceed would "unreasonably federalize the common law
of 'garden variety' business fraud, and eclipse the federal securities laws." Id.
97 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th
Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983).
98 Id. at 1063.
99 See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 492.
100 See, e.g., Taylor v. Bear Steams & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (dis-
missing plaintiffs RICO claim, alleging loss of money due to unauthorized trades by
defendant and Paine Webber in order to generate commissions, on ground that claims
were not pled with sufficient particularity); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F.
Supp. 1002, 1007-08 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (dismissing complaint alleging churning of custo-
dial account as not "injury of the type the RICO statute was intended to prevent");
Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (dismissing complaint
alleging securities fraud by sellers of interests in insolvent coal mining partnership on
basis that "[n]othing . . .even remotely brings this case within the ambit of [RICO's]
purpose"); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 753 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
("[h]ad Congress intended to turn all securities fraud actions into treble damage suits, it
would have, at the very least, given some indications of that purpose"). But see Note,
Application of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to Securities Viola-
tions, 8J. CORP. L. 411, 431-32 (because courts' primary concern under RICO should be
to inhibit organized crime rather than to remedy specific injuries of particular plaintiffs,
"the courts should not concern themselves with whether there is a pre-existing civil rem-
edy if they intend to allow RICO to be used as an effective weapon against organized
crime").
The Sedima court did not expressly exclude securities fraud cases from the scope of
the private civil RICO action. See 741 F.2d at 496 n.41. The court nevertheless listed
securities fraud cases as prime examples of RICO's misuse. Id. at 487-88 nn.10, 13 &
15.
101 545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
102 Id. at 1007-08.
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federal district court found that "[t]he civil remedies provisions of
RICO were not designed to convert every fraud or misrepresenta-
tion action involving corporations who use the mails or telephones
to conduct their businesses in interstate commerce into treble dam-
ages RICO actions." 10 4
The Second Circuit panel which refused to follow Sedima in
Furman v. Cirrito'05 effectively countered the duplication of remedies
argument. "What distinguishes a civil RICO claim from an ordinary
fraud claim," the panel asserted, "is that RICO requires a 'pattern
of racketeering activity' (two acts within 10 years) used to conduct
the affairs of an 'enterprise.' "106 "While the proof used to establish
these elements may in particular cases coalesce," proof of each is
essential.' 0 7 The enterprise's activities must also affect interstate
commerce.108 Proof of the underlying offenses alone is insufficient
to establish the RICO claim. 10 9 Thus, rather than merely enhancing
penalties for already compensable injuries, Congress created new
sanctions for RICO violations. 110 As the Third Circuit has held,
RICO "forbids 'racketeering,' not state offenses per se."" 1l
3. Potential for Abuse
Congress recognized that civil RICO claims might stigmatize
private businesses. Representatives Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan ex-
103 527 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. La. 1981).
104 Id. at 260. Another district court requiring a "racketeering enterprise injury"
based its decision at least in part on the observation that "[t]he victims of predicate
crimes almost always have a cause of action for direct damages under federal or state
law." Landmark Sav. & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 209 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (se-
curities, mail, and wire fraud); see also Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 285-86 (C.D.
Cal. 1982) (securities fraud) (Congress did not intend RICO merely to provide en-
hanced actions for recidivism).
105 751 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1984),petitionforcert.filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Oct. 15,
1984) (No. 84-604).
106 Furman, 741 F.2d at 529. Cf Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583 ("In order to secure a
conviction under RICO, the Government must prove both the existence of an 'enter-
prise' and the connected 'pattern of racketeering activity.' ").
107 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583; see also Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 22 (2d
Cir. 1983) (fraudulent tender offer) (evidence of "enterprise" need not be distinct from
that of "pattern of racketeering"), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984).
108 See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983) (listing elements
of § 1962(c) RICO violation).
109 See Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 1982), affid in part and rev'd in
part, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983).
110 One district court concluded that the fact that the "predicate crime here may
also be actionable under state fraud laws does not make RICO inapplicable." Hellenic
Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (defendants paid kick-
backs to plaintiff's employees to induce them to accept false invoices and padded bills).
111 United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1087 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1072 (1978).
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pressed Congress's concern over the potential for undue and there-
fore abusive stigmatization that would result from meritless claims:
[S]ection 1964(c) ... provides invitation for disgruntled and ma-
licious competitors to harass innocent businessmen engaged in in-
terstate commerce by authorizing private damage suits. A
competitor need only raise the claim that his rival has derived
gains from two games of poker, and, because this title prohibits
even the "indirect use" of such gains-a provision with tremen-
dous outreach-litigation is begun. What a protracted, expensive
trial may not succeed in doing, the adverse publicity may well ac-
complish--destruction of the rival's busines [sic]. 112
During floor debate Representative Mikva warned that a private
businessman could initiate a suit to besmirch his competitor's busi-
ness reputation even if on the merits he could not expect a judg-
ment. 13 Accordingly, Mikva proposed an amendment providing for
a frivolous suit remedy of treble damages for an acquitted section
1964(c) defendant. 114 The House rejected the amendment, 115 thus
indicating that it was not troubled by the potential for abuse
through stigmatization." 16
Congress also considered the problem of an overly broad appli-
cation of RICO. The ACLU warned that title IX's broad terms
might permit its application not only to professional racketeers, but
also "to a man who twice wins $1000 in a friendly gambling
game." ' 1 7 Senators Hart and Kennedy feared that individual rights
might not be adequately protected if RICO were applied outside of
112 H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1970).
113 116 CONG. REC. 35342 (1970).
114 Id.
115 The amendment was defeated 45 to 22. 116 CONG. REC. 35343 (1970).
116 The Furman panel was also "unmoved" by the stigma argument: "If defendants
are surprised or offended that their 'garden variety' fraudulent conduct is not statutorily
characterized as 'racketeering,' they should address their grievance to Congress, which
clearly and specifically included mail, wire, and securities frauds as predicate acts of
'racketeering activity' under § 1961(1) ..... Furman, 741 F.2d at 530; see also infra
notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
117 116 CONG. REC. at 35213. Sheldon Eison, Chairman of the ABA's Committee on
Federal Legislation, also cautioned that RICO's definition of "pattern of racketeering
activity" was overly broad:
(In § 1962(b) and (c)], I think, we have to take a look and see how broad
this provision of "pattern of racketeering activity" is. I think if you will
look at the underlying crimes which are involved, it would seem to apply
to a theft from an interstate shipment,. . . the "Mom and Pop" variety of
illegal gambling business, the local numbers place, a securities fraud
case. ...
We think that is too broad, particularly when you consider you are
dealing with a person's opportunity to engage in a business as a result of
having been involved in any of the acts which are defined as comprising
part of "a pattern of racketeering activity."
House Hearings, supra note 25, at 370.
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organized crime. 118 Congress nonetheless explicitly included mail,
wire, and securities fraud-all "white collar" crimes-in RICO's
prohibitions. 19 Senator McClellan, a RICO sponsor, defended the
breadth of the statutory terms on the ground that Congress could
not reach the activities of organized crime against which the statute
was drafted without also covering some offenses committed outside
the context of organized crime. 120
The courts have focused their debate over the expansiveness of
civil RICO's provisions on the scope of Congress's purposes in en-
acting RICO. Critics of an expansive reading point to RICO's pur-
pose, to eradicate organized crime in the United States, 121 as
limiting the scope of the statute's applicability to organized
criminals. 122 The Supreme Court in Turkette, however, cited RICO's
purpose and a clause in the statute calling for liberal construction 123
in rejecting a restrictive reading of RICO. The Court reasoned that
a narrow reading would place "[w]hole areas of organized criminal
activity .. .beyond the substantive reach of the enactment."' 124
The Court also emphasized the breadth of Congress's purpose in
118 S. REP. No. 612, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1969).
119 See supra note 116. The Sedima majority made much of the fact that § 1964(c) was
not included in S.30 when the Senate considered it. See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 488-89. The
Sedima panel's isolation of § 1964(c) from the rest of RICO runs counter to the principle
reinforced in Turkette that statutory language controls absent" 'a clearly expressed legis-
lative intent to the contrary.'" 452 U.S. at 580 (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980)); see also supra note 88.
There are at least two indications that the Senate was aware of the treble damages
provision and what it entailed. First, Senator Hruska had introduced the Criminal Activ-
ities Profits Act (S. 1623) on March 20, 1969. This bill contained provisions for both
treble damages and private equitable relief. The Senator noted that the civil provisions
were "the more important feature of the bill." He went on to inform the Senate that
"[t]he bill is innovative in the sense that it vitalizes procedures which have been tried
and proven in the antitrust field and applies them into the organized crime field where
they have been seldom used before." 115 CONG. REC. 6993-94 (1969). Second, Senator
McClellan, a sponsor of S. 30 (Organized Crime Control Act), noted the amendments
that the ABA had suggested in the House:
In the main, I find these amendments generally acceptable. Indeed, they
may be characterized as constructive contributions to the legislative pro-
cess. For example, amendment No. 6 suggests that title IX of S. 30, deal-
ing with racketeer-influenced and corrupt organizations, be amended to
authorize private civil damages suits.
116 CONG. REC. 25190 (1970).
120 116 CONG. REC. 18940 (1970); see supra note 119. The substantive provisions of
RICO in § 1962, and not the private civil remedy in § 1964(c), determine its breadth.
121 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969). In Waterman S.S. Corp. v.
Avondale Shipyards, 527 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. La. 1981), the district court viewed the civil
remedies of § 1964 as designed "to provide an effective mechanism for eradictating or-
ganized crime from the social fabric." 527 F. Supp. at 260.
122 See, e.g., Waterman S.S. Corp., 527 F. Supp. at 260.
123 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
124 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 589.
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Russello v. United States.' 25 In Russello, the Court found that Con-
gress's goal in creating the private civil remedy was to "separat[e]
the racketeer from his dishonest gains thereby taking the profit out
of organized crime."' 126 As with criminal forfeiture, the private civil
action was one of RICO's "new legal weapons" to combat a perva-
sive social and economic evil.' 27 The courts should not undermine
Congress's intent that RICO be broadly construed by restricting ac-
cess to the private civil action.128
B. Standing Requirements
The case law regarding appropriate standing requirements for
civil RICO plaintiffs is in disarray. The court in Sedima perpetuated
the confusion by imposing a "racketeering injury" requirement. Ac-
cording to the Second Circuit, a "racketeering injury" occurs when
"mobsters . . . cause systematic harm to competition and the mar-
ket, and thereby injure investors and competitors."'' 29 This defini-
tion contains elements of at least three previous judicial limitations
on the scope of civil RICO:' 30 the organized crime nexus require-
ment, the competitive injury requirement, and the "racketeering in-
jury" or "racketeering enterprise injury" requirement. These
limitations are not supported by RICO's language, legislative his-
tory, or purpose.
1. The "Organized Crime Nexus" Requirement
Although the congressional record abounds with references to
organized crime, the Mafia, and La Cosa Nostra, RICO does not use
or define the term "organized crime." One court131 has viewed the
125 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983). The Court in Russello held that RICO's criminal forfeiture
provisions apply to profits obtained from racketeering activities and not only to interests
held in RICO enterprises. Id.
126 Id.
127 116 CONG. REC. 819 (1970) (statement of Sen. Scott).
128 Cf Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587 (because Congress acted within its authority, courts
are without power to restrict statute's application).
129 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 495-96.
130 In Haroco, the Seventh Circuit found that "the Second Circuit's new definition of
the racketeering injury requirement appears to be essentially an amalgamation of pro-
posed limits on RICO which we rejected in Schacht v. Brown, [711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 509 (1983)] as contrary to the language and purpose of RICO."
747 F.2d at 389. The Schacht court rejected both the organized crime nexus requirement
and the competitive injury requirement. See infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text;
infra text accompanying note 159; see also In re Catanella & E.F. Hutton & Co., 583 F.
Supp. 1388, 1435 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("There is much to suggest that this racketeer enter-
prise injury concept is similar or at least related to the competitive injury concept."). See
generally Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., 742 F.2d 408, 413 (8th Cir. 1984)
(court implied willingness to allow RICO claims, where pattern of racketeering activity,
and not merely predicate acts, caused injury).
131 See Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 747 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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lack of a definition as an expression of Congress's desire to avoid
the practical difficulties entailed in defining what constitutes "organ-
ized crime."' 13 2 A narrow definition of organized crime would create
serious constitutional difficulties by creating a status offense.' 33
Judicial interpretations of RICO's lack of an organized crime
definition follow two divergent courses. Under one approach,
courts have maintained that Congress would have put an organized
crime nexus requirement into the statute but for its probable uncon-
stitutionality.' 3 4 These courts read the requirement into RICO. 135
Under the second, more popular approach, courts have not re-
quired an organized crime nexus. The Sedima court ignored the
prior Second Circuit decision, Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 13 6 which
rejected the requirement. The Seventh Circuit has concurred in this
view, concluding "[i]t is well-established that RICO does not re-
quire proof that the defendant or the enterprise are connected with
organized crime."' 137 That circuit rejected the organized crime
nexus because "where business fraud is alleged. . . there is simply
no legitimate principled criterion through which to accomplish this
132 RICO's sponsor explained that "it is probably impossible precisely and defini-
tively to define organized crime." 116 CONG. REC. 35204 (1970); see also Adair, 526 F.
Supp. at 747 (organized crime nexus would create constitutional "difficulties").
'33 116 CONG. Rxc. 35344 (1970). E.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666
(1962) (striking down California law which had the effect of making "the 'status' of nar-
cotic addiction a criminal offense" as violative of the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments). Representative Poff resisted an attempt to include definitions of the Mafia and
La Cosa Nostra in RICO. 116 CONG. REC. at 35344.
134 See, e.g., Adair, 526 F. Supp. at 747 (interpreting RICO's broad language as at-
tempt to avoid constitutional difficulties).
135 The organized crime nexus requirement has proven especially popular in the
securities context. One court, although generally rejecting the organized crime nexus,
has held that in the limited case of civil actions predicated on federal securities law,
plaintiffs "must allege some link to organized crime, however defined." Hokama v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1983); see also Aliberti v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 591 F. Supp. 632, 633 (D. Mass. 1984) ("Even if not technically required, . . . a
connection between organized crime and the alleged racketeers is an important consid-
eration in determining whether a particular claim is 'within [RICO's] spirit, [or] within
the intention of its makers' "; also noting existing remedies for securities fraud); Noonan
v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (dismissing RICO securities
fraud action by buyers of limited partnership interests in insolvent coal mining partner-
ship); Waterman S.S. Corp., 527 F. Supp. at 260 (dismissing RICO claim for damages
suffered from failure of high-speed engine couplings on ground that "the history of the
statute reveals a clearly expressed legislative intent that RICO should apply only to ac-
tions involving organized crime activities, and not to everyday civil actions") (footnote
omitted); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (denying motion
for leave to amend complaint to allege RICO violation in price fixing action against
telephone answering service on ground that "[d]efendant is not a member of a society of
criminals operating outside of the law").
136 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983).
137 Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1287 n.6
(7th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
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[organized crime] distinction."13 8 Both the Fifth 139 and the
Eighth 40 Circuits have reviewed the legislative history and rejected
an organized crime nexus. Most district courts have adopted the
second approach.141 Thus, in imposing what amounts to an organ-
ized crime nexus requirement, the Sedima court departed from the
great weight of authority.
On a more general level, the Sedima court's approach departs
from Supreme Court decisions in other areas which caution the
lower courts not to judicially limit the scope of broadly drafted anti-
crime measures. In United States v. Culbert, 142 for example, the Court
refused to limit the Hobbs Act 143 to "racketeers."' 144 The Court
held that "the absence of any reference to 'racketeering'-much less
any definition of the word-is strong evidence that Congress did not
intend to make 'racketeering' an element of a Hobbs Act viola-
tion."' 145 Similarly, the Court in Perrin v. United States146 refused to
restrict the scope of the Travel Act,147 which prohibits the use of a
facility in interstate commerce to commit bribery in violation of cer-
tain state laws. The petitioner in Perrin contended that commercial
bribery, being merely a white collar crime, was not covered by the
138 Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1356 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 509
(1983); see also United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1979) (court re-
jected organized crime nexus requirement, stating that RICO could apply to anyone "if
the statutory conditions are met").
139 Owl Constr. Co. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 727 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir.
1984).
140 Bennettv. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983).
141 See, e.g., Austin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 667
(W.D. Mich. 1983) (securities fraud context); Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("The plain language of the statute does
not require RICO plaintiffs to allege that defendants are affiliated with organized
crime."); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244, 247-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(same); Parnes v. Heinhold Commodities, 487 F. Supp. 645, 646 (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("The
language of the statute, however, requires neither proof nor allegation of any connec-
tion to organized crime for a violation to lie.").
142 435 U.S. 371 (1978).
143 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1982). The Hobbs Act provides:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce
or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or
extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens
physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or
purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
Id.
144 See Culbert, 435 U.S. at 373; "Everybody's Darling" supra note 94, at 674.
145 Culbert, 435 U.S. at 373. RICO refers to "racketeering activity," but it does not
limit that term to organized criminal activities. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982); supra text
accompanying notes 131-33.
146 444 U.S. 37 (1979); See "Everybody's Darling'; supra note 94, at 674-75 (applying
Court's reasoning in Perrin to RICO).
147 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b) (1982).
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Travel Act, because Congress intended the Act only to reach organ-
ized crime.148 The Court noted that Congress had found bribery to
be a method of organized crime's infiltration into legitimate busi-
nesses and upheld the application of the Travel Act to commercial
bribery. 149 In each of these cases, the Court deferred to Congress's
intent to combat activity outside of that traditionally referred to as
"organized crime" or "racketeering." In keeping with this ap-
proach, the Sedima court should not have read the racketeering in-
jury requirement into RICO.
The Sedima majority imposed a racketeering injury formulation
that was merely a euphemism for an organized crime nexus require-
ment.150 The majority thus grafted onto civil RICO a requirement
which had already been rejected in its own circuit, 51 in other cir-
cuits, and in the criminal RICO context. 152
2. The Competitive Injury Requirement
Some courts rejecting an "organized crime nexus" have instead
imposed a competitive injury requirement. These courts have relied
on the similarity of the language in section 1964(c) of RICO to that
in section 4 of the Clayton Act, which imposes a "competitive in-
jury" requirement on Clayton Act plaintiffs. 15 Section 1964(c) re-
quires an "injury by reason of a violation of section 1962; courts
that require a competitive injury reason that "the purpose of
148 Perrin, 444 U.S. at 46.
149 Id. at 46-47.
150 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 509 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). One district court has
found the racketeering injury requirement to be "analytically indistinguishable" from
the organized crime nexus requirement. Windsor Assocs. v. Greenfeld, 564 F. Supp.
273, 279 (D. Md. 1983) (business fraud). Indeed, courts analyzing the racketeering in-
jury requirement imposed in Sedima have emphasized its organized crime nexus ele-
ments. The Eighth Circuit in Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., 742 F.2d 409
(8th Cir. 1984), criticized the Sedima majority for requiring "that the injury result from
mobster activity or the efforts of organized crime," and therefore rejected the Sedima
limitation. Id. at 413. Accord Atlantic Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Fort Lauderdale v. Dade
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 592 F. Supp. 1089, 1092-93 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (emphasizing Sedima's
"mobster" language).
151 See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983); supra note 136 and
accompanying text.
152 "[T]he so-called organized crime requirement has not found acceptance in the
criminal RICO context. . . . Yet, on the civil side, where the stakes are presumably not
as high, some courts have been willing to restrict a civil RICO claim by requiring a...
nexus with organized crime." Catanella, 583 F. Supp. at 1426-27 (citations omitted).
Such courts would allow civil RICO defendants a loophole not available to criminal
RICO defendants who face the possibility of long terms of imprisonment.
153 See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); see also Comment, Reading the "Enterprise" Element Back Into RICO: Sections 1962 and
1964(c), 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 100, 129 (1981) ("the fact that section 1964(c) was patterned
after the antitrust remedies reinforces the notion that Congress was concerned with com-
petitive injury") (emphasis in original).
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§ 1964(c) was not to transform state law violations into federal vio-
lations, but to prevent interference with free competition."'' 54 The
Seventh Circuit in Haroco claimed to identify a competitive injury
element in Sedima's racketeering injury requirement.' 55
Most federal courts have rejected the competitive injury re-
quirement 56 on two grounds. First, the requirement is inconsistent
with congressional intent.' 57 Second, the purposes of RICO differ
from those underlying the antitrust law. One purpose of antitrust
legislation is to protect competition. An antitrust defendant should,
therefore, not be so injured after the application of antitrust penal-
ties that he cannot stay in business. Thus, strict standing limitations
on private antitrust actions are appropriate to prevent a plethora of
private suits from driving an antitrust defendant out of business.
One of RICO's purposes is to put the organized criminal out of
business. 158 Thus, engrafting a competitive injury requirement
onto RICO could reduce its effectiveness in eliminating organized
crime by increasing the possibility that offenders will economically
survive after violating the statute. 59 For both of these reasons, the
154 North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 210 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(business fraud involving real estate development venture).
155 747 F.2d at 395. The Haroco court noted that under Sedima the plaintiff need not
show an actual anticompetitive effect "if the injury were of the type which would ordi-
narily threaten competition." Id.; see Sedima, 741 F.2d at 495-96 & n.41. Judge
Cardamone in dissent objected that any analogy to antitrust limitations is "misplaced."
Sedima, 741 F.2d at 509. The Sedima opinion thus allows the conclusion that "a racke-
teering injury is indistinguishable from a competitive or commercial injury." Kimmel v.
Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 494 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (rejecting antitrust competitive injury
requirement in securities fraud case).
156 See infra notes 157-59.
157 See Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1240
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (pointing out that securities brokerage infiltrated by organized crime
and defrauding its customers would not cause injury to competition, but should surely
fall under RICO's condemnation). The Sedima majority acknowledged that RICO might
apply in the absence of an injury to competition, as where "all competitors are being
extorted from equally." Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496 n.41.
Senator McClellan, a sponsor of RICO, stated that he did not intend to incorporate
antitrust standing limitations into RICO. After noting that the bill drew heavily from
antitrust remedies, he stated that there was "no intention here of importing the great
complexity of antitrust law enforcement into this field." 115 CONo. REC. 9567 (1969).
See generally 115 CONG. REC. 6995 (1969) (report of ABA Antitrust Section asserting un-
desirability of incorporating antitrust standing principles into RICO).
158 Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing statement of Sen.
Hruska, 116 CONG. REC. 602 (1970)), afd in part and rev'd in part, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983); see also In re Action Indus. Tender
Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 852 (E.D. Va. 1983) (noting that "antitrust laws were designed
to avoid concentration in industry" while "RICO borrow[s] the tools of antitrust law to
fight corruption in general"); Hellenic Lines, 523 F. Supp. at 248 ("RICO does not coun-
tenance racketeering activity so long as it is done uniformly among competing
concerns.").
159 See Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1358; see also Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d at 1059 ("In a
RICO context, there are few countervailing reasons to lessen the impact of RICO reme-
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courts should not engraft a competitive injury requirement onto
RICO.
3. The Racketeering Injury Requirement
The phrase "by reason of a violation of section 1962"160 is the
source of immense confusion for federal courts. Courts imposing a
"racketeering injury" requirement on RICO plaintiffs invariably cite
the "by reason of" language as the source of this limitation. The
court in Sedima found the same language in the Clayton Act and
drew an analogy to antitrust law to interpret the phrase. The court
held that the "by reason of" language was intended to limit stand-
ing in civil RICO actions to those who suffered an "injury of the
type RICO was designed to prevent."' 6 ' Several district courts have
adopted similar racketeering injury standing limitations. 162
Although these courts reject wholesale application of antitrust prin-
ciples to RICO, they hold that, as in antitrust law, "[i]t is clear that
Congress realized that a standing or proximate cause requirement
was necessary with respect to the treble damages provision."' 63 Be-
dies by importing the limitations on standing which apply in antitrust law."); 115 CONG.
REC. 6994-95 (1969) (statement of Sen. Hruska). See generally Note, Civil RICO: The
Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1101, 1112 (1982)
(although Congress did not desire to drive Clayton Act defendants out of marketplace, it
"purposely designed RICO to threaten violators with economic ruin").
160 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
161 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 495. The definitional language is borrowed from Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) ("[p]aintiffs must prove
antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent") (emphasis in original).
162 See, e.g., Margolis v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 585 F. Supp. 595, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(dismissing complaint where individual acts of fraud in newspaper advertisements were
sole cause of plaintiff's injury) (following Sedima); Bruns v. Ledbetter, 583 F. Supp. 1050,
1056 (S.D. Cal. 1984) (plaintiffs alleging injuries only from multiple acts of securities
fraud lacked RICO standing); Hudson v. Larouche, 579 F. Supp. 623, 630 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (plaintiffs must allege "something more" than injury from predicate acts of mail
and wire fraud); Gitterman v. Vitoulas, 579 F. Supp. 423, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (com-
plaint dismissed where allegations were of direct injury only); In re Action Indus. Tender
Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 851-52 (E.D. Va. 1983) (defining racketeering injury as "the
type of injury that RICO was designed to prevent" and requiring that one be alleged for
civil RICO claim to proceed); Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp.
352, 358 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (same); Johnson v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 285-86 (C.D.
Cal. 1982) (dismissing RICO complaint where alleged injury resulted directly from de-
fendant's fraudulent inducement of plaintiffs to enter oil and gas lease); Harper v. New
Japan Sec. Int'l Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (civil RICO plaintiffs
must allege more than injuries from defendants' individual acts of securities fraud);
Landmark Sav. & Loan v. Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206, 209
(E.D. Mich. 1981) (requiring racketeering enterprise injury for civil RICO standing and
noting that "[t]he victims of predicate crimes almost always have a cause of action for
direct damages under federal or state law").
163 Harper, 545 F. Supp. at 1007; see also Bruns v. Ledbetter, 583 F. Supp. 1050, 1056
(S.D. Cal. 1984) (analogizing to Clayton Act to justify racketeering enterprise injury
requirement).
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cause of the paucity of legislative history concerning RICO's treble
damages provision, these decisions rely on the conclusion that "the
antitrust analogy is the construction of the statute which is most
likely to reflect Congress' understanding of the words 'by reason
of.' "164
The racketeering injury requirement can be attacked on three
grounds. First, some courts have argued that neither the statute's
plain language nor its legislative history warrants the require-
ment.1 65 The "by reason of" language in section 1964(c) does not
mandate or suggest a standing limitation. One court has held that
the statute's "requirement of 'injury by reason of a violation of sec-
tion 1962' should be read as simply requiring that the plaintiff was
injured by at least two acts of racketeering activity." 1 66 The Haroco
court read the "by reason of" language as merely imposing a proxi-
mate cause requirement. 167 The Fifth Circuit employed a similar
proximate cause analysis in a recent RICO case involving a violation
of a state anti-bribery statute. 168 The language of section 1964(c)
imposes only a proximate cause requirement; 169 turning to either
164 Harper, 545 F. Supp. at 1008.
165 See Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1240
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (legislative history does not justify either racketeering injury require-
ment or competitive injury requirement); Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1580
(E.D. Mich. 1983) ("nothing in the statute or legislative history authorizes such a [racke-
teering injury] limitation"); see also infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
166 Kirschner v. Cable/Tel Corp., 576 F. Supp. 234, 244 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
167 Haroco, 747 F.2d at 398. The court explained the proximate cause rule as
follows:
As we read this "by reason of" language, it simply imposes a proximate
cause requirement on plaintiffs. The criminal conduct in violation of sec-
tion 1962 must directly or indirectly, have injured the plaintiff's business
or property. A defendant who violates section 1962 is not liable for
treble damages to everyone he might have injured by other conduct, nor
is the defendant liable to those who have not been injured. This causa-
tion requirement might not be subtle, elegant or imaginative, but we be-
lieve it is based on a straight forward reading of the statute as Congress
intended it to be read.
Id.
168 Alcorn Co., Miss. v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, 731 F.2d 1160, 1168 (5th Cir.
1984). After finding that the complaint alleged the acts of bribery, the court's only fur-
ther inquiry was whether the RICO violation "damaged the business of [the plaintiff]."
Id. at 1169.
169 See supra notes 167-68; see also Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 581 F. Supp. 88, 96
(E.D. Pa. 1984) ("by reason of" language "should. . . be read as simply requiring that
the plaintiff was injured by at least two acts of racketeering-a pattern-charged to the
defendant"). The "pattern" element should not be extended artifically beyond the defi-
nition Congress assigned to it. See supra text accompanying note 20 (definition of "pat-
tern of racketeering activity"); see also S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969)
("[T]he factor of continuity plus relationship. . . combines to produce a pattern."); 116
CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan) ("[T]he term 'pattern' itself
requires the showing of a relationship"). Two racketeering acts committed by the same
defendant within a ten year period constitute the requisite continuity and relationship.
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the organized crime nexus or antitrust analogy to flesh out the "by
reason of" language is unjustified.
Second, the racketeering injury requirement is unworkably
vague; no court adopting the requirement has "provided guidance
as to what constitutes such an injury." 170 The much-quoted decision
in Landmark Savings & Loan v. Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 17 1
stated that such an injury might arise "if a civil RICO defendant's
ability to harm the plaintiff is enhanced by the infusion of money
from a pattern of racketeering activity into the enterprise." 172 The
Furman court correctly pointed out, however, that this statement
fails to define the injury and does little to limit RICO's reach be-
cause it would describe almost any RICO violation. 173 The district
courts that impose the requirement merely cite each other without
defining the phrase "racketeering injury." 174 Courts are increas-
ingly recognizing that "racketeering injury" has no established
meaning. 175 Sedima also failed to give any meaning to the term. A
term with no established meaning gives courts too much discretion
in determining whether a plaintiff may recover under RICO.
Third, the racketeering injury requirement insulates from
RICO's sanctions conduct that "lie[s] near the center of Congress'
concern" in enacting the statute. 176 In Haroco the Seventh Circuit
noted that the racketeering injury limitation tends to limit the civil
RICO remedy to indirect injuries and to exclude actions for injuries
resulting directly from the predicate offenses. 177 The district court
Thus, they sufficiently support a civil RICO claim, provided the other elements, such as
enterprise and interstate effect, are present. Although it is true that a plaintiff could be
indirectly injured by the pattern and not by the predicate acts, if each predicate act in-
jures the plaintiff, then the pattern has also injured him.
170 Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 530 (2d Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 53
U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1984) (No. 84-604).
171 527 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
172 Id. at 209.
173 Furman, 741 F.2d at 530.
174 E.g., Hudson, 579 F. Supp. at 630.
175 See Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F. Supp. 561, 569 (N.D. Cal. 1984) ("A growing
number of courts have come to recognize [the requirement is] meaningless" and are
beginning to reject it.).
176 Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1240
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
177 Haroco, 747 F.2d at 398. Courts reading RICO to cover only indirect injuries
read the "by reason of a violation of section 1962" language restrictively. They argue
that this clause excludes injuries resulting from the predicate acts and hold that the
injury giving rise to the RICO claim must result from the pattern. These courts ignore
the fact that whenever injury occurs from the pattern (two RICO predicate acts), the
predicate acts must of necessity be contributing causes of the injury. Thus, it is more
accurate to say that the racketeering injury requirement serves to limit RICO recovery to
cases in which the predicate acts are not the proximate cause of the injury. See, e.g., infra
text accompanying note 178.
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in Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 17 8 stated that organized
criminals who infiltrated a brokerage firm might cause direct injury
by defrauding the firm's customers. Nevertheless, if the racketeer-
ing injury requirement were applied, the criminals could escape civil
RICO liability if their acts of fraud, as a "pattern of racketeering
activity," did not cause an indirect injury. 179 Congress surely in-
tended RICO's sanctions to apply in such a case. The Seventh Cir-
cuit in Schacht v. Brown'80 held that "RICO was designed to protect
direct, and not just second order, victims of organized crime infiltra-
tion." 181 The Fourth Circuit recently sustained a RICO complaint
alleging only direct injury from the defendant's extortionate acts. 182
To the extent the Second Circuit in Sedima has limited recovery only
to those injured indirectly by RICO violations, it has deprived RICO
of much of its effectiveness. 183
Neither RICO's language nor its legislative history supports the
racketeering injury requirement. The requirement also is inconsis-
tent with the liberal construction that Congress statutorily man-
dated. 18 4 Congress intended RICO to "bring. . .to bear on the
infiltration of organized crime into legitimate business or other or-
178 567 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
179 Id. at 1240.
180 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508 (1984).
181 Id. at 1358 (emphasis in original); see Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost
Mach. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1146, 1157 (D.NJ. 1983) (noting that racketeering enterprise
injury requirement "could lead to the anomalous result of denying standing to persons
concededly the direct victims of racketeering activity"); Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47, 49-50 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (RICO purpose of divesting organ-
ized crime associations of ill-gotten gains "would be severely undermined if persons
who suffered direct harm from racketeering activity. . . could not recover in the ab-
sence of a showing of some 'special' harm or some overall anti-competitive effect").
182 Battlefield Builders, Inc. v. Sevango, 743 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1984). The district
court dismissed the complaint on the ground that "garden-variety commercial breach of
contract [or] fraud. . . isn't what RICO was designed to remedy." Id. at 1062-63. The
Fourth Circuit reversed, rejecting the district court's contention that the complaint
should allege "some pattern of something that would be called 'racketeering.'" Id. at
1063.
183 The Second Circuit in Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir.
1984), petition for cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S.Jan. 7, 1985) (No. 84-654), was even
more restrictive in its limitation of RICO to indirect injuries than it was in Sedima. Cf
Haroco, 747 F.2d at 398 ("[B]y restricting civil RICO to. . .indirect injuries. . .Bankers
Trust reduces RICO's civil provisions to a trivial remedy, available in only a tiny fraction
of RICO violations and dependent upon entirely fortuitous facts."); see also Bankers Trust,
741 F.2d at 522 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) ("even a convicted Mafia defendant could
escape civil liability for the harm done his intended victim under the majority's
reasoning").
184 When Congress enacted RICO in 1970, it included the mandate that "[t]he pro-
visions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose." 18
U.S.C. § 1961 note (1982) (Liberal Construction of Provisions). See also Note, RICO and
the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 167, 182 (1980) ("interpretational pro-
visions give Congress some control over the attitude courts will adopt, enhancing the
likelihood that the construction will reflect the true intent of Congress").
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ganizations the full panoply of civil remedies."1 85 To limit RICO to
indirect injuries "is to sterilize civil RICO as a weapon against the
conduct congress sought to curtail." 186
C. Requirement of a Prior Criminal Conviction
The Sedima majority held that "a prior criminal conviction is a
prerequisite to a civil RICO action." 187 The court is the first to ex-
plicitly require prior conviction. 88 To reach this unprecedented re-
sult, the Sedima court unjustifiably rejected contrary case law. The
court misinterpreted RICO's statutory language, Congress's intent
in passing the Act, and constitutional concerns over its implementa-
tion. There should be no prior criminal conviction requirement in
civil RICO actions.
1. Case Law
The Sedima majority failed adequately to address a large body of
case law holding that a prior criminal conviction is unnecessary to a
civil action under RICO.18 9 Both the Sixth Circuit and the Seventh
Circuit have held that no language in RICO justifies a prior criminal
conviction requirement.190 These courts have followed the Supreme
185 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1969).
186 Furman, 741 F.2d at 529.
187 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496. The court required prior conviction for the predicate
acts, not prior conviction under RICO. Id. at 497-98. The Seventh Circuit in Haroco did
not address the prior criminal conviction issue, except to note that Sedima's holding con-
flicted with the holding in Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d
1271, 1286-87 (7th Cir. 1983). See Haroco, 747 F.2d at 393 n.12.
188 The court in Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp.
1125, 1137 n.12 (D. Mass. 1982), stated in dicta that "although it is difficult for us to
conclude that Congress, in using the words 'indictable' and 'punishable' contemplated
that civil liability could result without involvement of the criminal process, other courts
have done so." The court in Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 525 F. Supp. 1019,
(N.D. Ga.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Morosani v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 703
F.2d 1220 (11 th Cir. 1983), without reaching the issue opined that "[it may well be that
entitlement to the civil remedy of section 1964 should be conditioned upon a criminal
conviction or at least an indictment." Kleiner, 525 F. Supp. at 1022 n.2. The Sedima
court cited no other authority for its holding on the criminal conviction issue.
189 See, e.g, Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1287
(7th Cir. 1983) (discussed infra note 190); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc.,
689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982) (discussed infra note 190); State Farm Fire & Casu-
alty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 675-76 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (plain language of
§ 1964(c) requires only showing that defendant violated § 1962, not prior conviction
under § 1963); Glusband v. Benjamin, 530 F. Supp. 240, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (statute's
plain language controls because its legislative history reveals no intent to limit RICO's
scope; prior conviction not required); Parnes v. Heinhold Commod., Inc., 487 F. Supp.
645, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (plain language controls; no prior conviction required); Farm-
ers Bank of State ofDel, v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978)
(same).
190 In Bunker Ramo Corp., the Seventh Circuit held that "section 1964(c) creates a
private right of action for parties injured by conduct that violates section 1962 without
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Court's directive in United States v. Turkette' 91 that "[i]f the statutory
language is unambiguous, in the absence of 'a clearly expressed leg-
islative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be re-
garded as conclusive.' "192 Congress's intent with regard to a prior
criminal conviction requirement under civil RICO is not "clearly ex-
pressed." 193 However, the statutory language establishing civil
RICO creates a private right of action without reference to prior
criminal convictions. 194 Thus, a plain language analysis requires the
rejection of the prior criminal conviction requirement. Therefore,
the Sedima majority violated the Supreme Court's directive in
Turkette. 195
In Sedima, the Second Circuit also unjustifiably dismissed the
Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Cappetto.196 In Cappetto
the court held that the government need not first obtain a criminal
RICO conviction in order to bring an action for injunctive relief
under section 1964(a). 197 The Sedima court attempted to distinguish
Cappetto, arguing that the Cappetto decision approved only the gov-
ernment's right to bring an injunctive action under section 1964(a)
and did not speak to whether a prior conviction is required in pri-
vate suits brought under section 1964(c).' 98 The Second Circuit's
conclusion is incorrect in that both section 1964(a) and section
1964(c) refer to "violations of section 1962."199 Thus, a consistent
interpretation of the provisions that takes proper regard of their
any requirement of prior criminal conviction for that conduct." 713 F.2d at 1287. The
Sixth Circuit held in USACO Coal Co., that "[bly referring in § 1964(c) only to the unlaw-
ful acts of § 1962, Congress has created a civil remedy that is independent of criminal
proceedings under § 1963." 689 F.2d at 95 n.1. The Sedima majority correctly pointed
out that the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in USACO Coal would show only that Congress did
not intend to require a prior conviction under criminal RICO, § 1963. Sedima, 741 F.2d
at 497-98. However, the USACO Coal court also rested its opinion on the use of the word
"unlawful" (as opposed to "criminal") in § 1962, and on Turkette's plain meaning ap-
proach. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
191 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
192 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580 (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylva-
nia, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
193 See infra notes 225-31 and accompanying text.
194 See infra notes 201-23 and accompanying text.
195 Cf. Maxwell v. Southwest Nat'l Bank, 593 F. Supp. 250, 255 (D. Kan. 1984) (prior
criminal conviction requirement in "Sedima fashions a limitation which runs completely
contrary to the express language of the statute and then imputes an intent upon Con-
gress which is not justified by the legislative history"); Kitchens v. U.S. Shelter, No. 82-
1951 (D.S.C. Oct. 20, 1984) (same).
196 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
197 Cappetto,502 F.2d at 1357. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982) provides:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to pre-
vent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing ap-
propriate orders. ...
198 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496-97.
199 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964(a), 1964(c); see also supra note 197 (quoting § 1964(a)).
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plain meaning must yield the conclusion that neither imposes a prior
criminal conviction requirement. 200
2. Statutory Language
The Supreme Court has stated that "[b]road general language
is not necessarily ambiguous when congressional objectives require
broad terms." 201 In Sedima, the Second Circuit mistook intention-
ally broad language for ambiguous language. 20 2 The Second Cir-
cuit's restrictive reading of RICO's private civil action gives
insufficient deference to Congress's broad goals.20 3
The Sedima majority found it necessary to read ambiguities into
RICO's language. The first perceived ambiguity stems from the
contrast between the phrase "by reason of a violation" in private
civil RICO and the phrase "by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws" in the Clayton Act.20 4 The majority reasoned that
the term "violation," when compared with the phraseology of the
Clayton Act, was synonomous with "conviction.- 20 5 The Clayton
Act does not require a prior criminal conviction before private lia-
bility can arise. The Sedima court found the change from the phrase
"anything forbidden" in the Clayton Act to the word "violation" in
RICO to be compelling evidence of congressional intent to impose a
prior criminal conviction requirement under RICO.20 6 The court
200 The Sedima court also advanced a policy basis for distinguishing Cappetto. The
court emphasized that "[a]s a matter of policy, government actions and private actions
are of course very different. Prosecutorial discretion, and in the case of RICO, guide-
lines from the Department of Justice, protect against overbroad use of RICO ....
There is no comparable way to limit private RICO." Sedima, 741 F.2d at 497 (citations
omitted). This argument is unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, the plain lan-
guage of the statute draws no distinction between private and public actions with regard
to a prior criminal conviction requirement. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
Both the public civil action and the private action are granted to prevent or redress
violations of § 1962. A plain meaning analysis therefore calls for the provisions to be
treated similarly with regard to the prior criminal conviction requirement. See supra
notes 190-95 and accompanying text. Second, the majority iguoredJudge Cardamone's
argument for not distinguishing Cappetto because "[o]rdinarily more, not less, protection
is expected for a defendant when the government is plaintiff. When the plaintiff is a
private party ... the quick dismissal of Cappetto totally ignores the 'private attorney
general' rationale built into RICO." Sedima, 741 F.2d at 504-05 (Cardamone, J.,
dissenting).
201 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980).
202 The Haroco court viewed RICO as "a statute which is not ambiguous, but which
is, above all, deliberately and extraordinarily broad." 747 F.2d at 398. This view was
the "root of the conflict" between its position and that taken by the Second Circuit in
Sedima. See supra text accompanying note 75.
203 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 note (1982) (Statement of Findings and Purposes); see also
supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
204 See supra note 45.
205 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 498-99.
206 Id.
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acknowledged that the word "violation" might be merely a short-
hand for "anything forbidden" but concluded that it is more likely
that the change was made with the intent of establishing a prior
criminal conviction requirement. 20 7
The Sedima majority was mistaken when it inferred that Con-
gress meant the term "violation" to be read as synonomous with
"conviction." The term "violations" appears elsewhere in the anti-
trust laws and is not there synonomous with "conviction. ' 20 8 "Vio-
lations" also appears in RICO sections giving the United States
government the right to restrain RICO violations. 20 9 Finally, "viola-
tions" appears in the private civil action provided for in earlier
bills.210 In these contexts "violation" was never equated with "con-
viction." Indeed, several courts have considered and rejected this
argument.211
The provision of a private action for those injured by a "viola-
tion of section 1962" does not support a requirement of prior con-
viction on the predicate acts of racketeering activity.2 12 The term
"violation" refers to RICO's substantive prohibitions in section
1962, not to the predicate acts listed in section 1961.213 The term
207 Id.
208 Commenting on the contrast between RICO's language and that of the Clayton
Act, the American Law Division of the Library of Congress noted:
Although it could be argued that the difference between 'forbidden by the
antitrust laws" and "violations of this chapter" requires a prior conviction
in the second case not necessary in the antitrust situation, use of the term
"violation" elsewhere in the antitrust laws would weigh heavily against
such an interpretation, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 25, 26.
Victims of Crime, supra note 46, at 329.
209 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a); supra note 197 (quoting § 1964(a)). "Violations," as
used in § 1964(a), cannot mean "convictions" because it is impossible to "prevent and
restrain" a conviction. It would be strange indeed if the House were to include in a
different subsection of the section containing 1964(a) a use of the term "violations" to
mean "convictions." Because "[tihe final statute blends both [government injunctive
and private] types of actions in a common section[,] they should receive ... a similar
construction." Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennet v.
Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 263 n.72 (1982).
210 See, e.g., S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 19586, H.R. 19215, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
211 The Seventh Circuit in Bunker Ramo considered and rejected the argument that
the difference in language between RICO and the Clayton Act indicated Congress's in-
tent to create a prior conviction requirement under RICO. See 713 F.2d at 1287; see also
Maxwell v. Southwest Nat'l Bank, 593 F. Supp. 250, 255 (D. Kan. 1984) ("word 'viola-
tion' can only be given its common and ordinary meaning, that of an 'infringement' or a
'breach of a right or a duty' "); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F.
Supp. 673, 675 (N.D. Ind. 1982) ("[s]ection 1962 says that.acts in violation of it are
'unlawful,' not criminal"); Parnes v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 647
(N.D. Ill. 1980) ("violation is not tantamount to conviction").
212 The predicate acts are defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Congress would have
referred to that section if it wished to require prior conviction under the laws listed
there.
213 The only logical inference from the use of "violation" in § 1964(c), if taken to be
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"violation" thus does not refer to whether a particular act is suffi-
cient to form the predicate for a private RICO action.
The Sedima majority also asserted that by describing the acts
that constitute racketeering activity as "indictable" and "charge-
able,"2 1 4 Congress demonstrated its intent that RICO impose a
prior conviction requirement. The terms "indictable" and "charge-
able" refer to the criminal law in that whether a person is indictable
or chargeable is normally determined through application of the
criminal law. 215 The Sedima court noted that courts in civil actions,
where proof is by preponderance of the evidence, do not usually
determine whether such purely criminal standards have been
met.216 From this the court deduced that Congress did not intend to
depart from tradition to give courts such power in the civil RICO
context. 217 Thus, under the Sedima court's reasoning, courts must
wait for criminal convictions on the predicate acts before hearing
civil RICO claims based on those acts.
The Sedima majority's interpretation of the ramifications of
Congress's use of "indictable" and "chargeable" is incorrect. As
Judge Cardamone asserted in dissent, Congress chose not to use the
words "for which an indictment or information has been returned or
filed."2 18 Judge Cardamone also noted that section 1964 is labelled
"Civil Remedies," and not "Post Criminal Conviction Civil Reme-
dies." 219 Moreover, even if the words "indictable" and "charge-
able" were to require an indictment or information, they do not
require an actual criminal conviction.220 In the criminal context, sev-
synonomous with "conviction," would be that Congress intended to require a prior con-
viction under RICO's substantive provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d). The statute's
structure refutes this possibility, and Sedima does not require it. See supra note 187. 18
U.S.C. § 1963 deals with criminal penalties for acts proscribed in § 1962, and requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 provides civil remedies for those
injured by the acts proscribed in § 1962. Section 1964 also gives the government the
right to seek injunctions to restrain § 1962 acts, which it may do without a § 1962 con-
viction. See United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 925 (1975); infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
214 These terms appear in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) ("chargeable under state law")
and 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (B) (listing "indictable" offenses under federal law, including
mail and wire fraud). The first section includes various state law offenses; the second
deals with federal offenses, including mail and wire fraud. Section 1962(1)(D) uses the
word "offense," and it includes securities frauds. The plaintiffs cause of action in Sedima
falls under § 1961 (1)(B), the "indictable" acts being mail and wire fraud.
215 See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 499.
216 Id. at 500.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 505 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
219 Id.
220 See I C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 121, at 338 (1982) ("An
indictment or information is the pleading by which the United States puts forward a
criminal charge.").
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eral circuits have held that the use of the word "chargeable" does
not require a conviction, or even a possibility of conviction, under
the state laws defining racketeering activity. 221 RICO's list of predi-
cate racketeering activities is intended "only to identify the type of
unlawful activity in which the defendant intended to engage." 222 In
using the words "indictable" and "chargeable," Congress was not
requiring actual indictment or conviction on the predicate acts.
Rather, it was merely defining the type of conduct that might invoke
RICO's sanctions. To require a prior conviction is to ignore the
breadth of Congress's language. 223
3. Congressional Intent
The Sedima majority imputed to Congress an intent to restrict
RICO's applicability to defendants with prior convictions based on a
perception that RICO was designed to punish only criminal con-
duct.224 The majority recognized that "Congress assumed a pre-
ponderance standard was appropriate" under civil RICO 225 but
reasoned that Congress must also have expected that a prior crimi-
nal conviction would be obtained. 226 The legislative history does
not support this reasoning. Congress viewed the lower standard of
proof as a method of facilitating recovery of ill-gotten gains. 227 A
prior criminal conviction requirement would frustrate this goal.
Such a prerequisite to recovery under RICO would, in essence, im-
221 The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 3535 (1984), held that conspiracy to murder and murder could constitute
the predicate acts requisite for a federal RICO prosecution even though the defendant
could not be separately punished for the two crimes under state law. Id. at 1047. The
court also held that the defendants' acquittal on the state law charges did not bar the
federal prosecution even though the defendants were no longer "chargeable" under
state law because of double jeopardy principles. Id. The Third and Fifth Circuits agree
that acquittal on the predicate state offenses does not prevent RICO prosecution even
though those acts are no longer "chargeable" under state law. See United States v. Ma-
latesta, 583 F.2d 748, 757 (5th Cir.), a fd on reh', 590 F.2d 1379 (1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 962 (1979); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1086 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
222 Frumento, 563 F.2d at 1087-88 (quoting United States v. Cerone, 452 F.2d 274,
286 (7th Cir. 1971)). See also id. at 1087 n.8A ("Section 1961 requires. . . only that the
conduct on which the federal charge is based be typical of the serious crime dealt with by
the state statute ....") (emphasis in original).
223 See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
224 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 501-02.
225 Id. at 502 (footnote omitted).
226 Id.
227 See House Hearings, supra note 25, at 106 ("This one-sided character of the crimi-
nal process has been a handicap in the use of the criminal law as a means of avoiding
infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime."); id. at 664 (statement of Rep.
Poff) ("The burden of proof under the civil-remedy section ...is much less than it
would be under the criminal remedy section. . . .We need not be preoccupied with
the criminal process when we can accomplish the same result by a civil remedy.").
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pose the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
would therefore defeat the purpose of Congress's "civil approach,"
which was designed to strike directly at the economic evils of racke-
teering.228 In addition, a prior conviction requirement would condi-
tion an injured RICO plaintiff's right of recovery on the
government's prior initiative in pursuing a criminal suit as to the
predicate acts. An injured plaintiff's right to recover damages
should not depend upon prosecutorial discretion, which involves
considerations unrelated to the plaintiff's right of recovery.
Two other factors indicate that Congress did not intend to im-
pose a prior criminal conviction requirement. First, the two recom-
mendations in the House for a private civil RICO action referred to
the private remedy under the antitrust laws, which does not require
a prior conviction.229 Thus, Congress would have made explicit any
intent to make RICO actions more restrictive for plaintiffs than ac-
tions under the antitrust laws. 23 0 Second, Congress intended
RICO's list of predicate racketeering acts only to encompass "of-
fenses committed by organized crime with substantial fre-
quency." 23 ' To require prior conviction on these predicate offenses
would defeat Congress's intent to define the type of conduct that
underlies RICO violations and not to redress the predicate acts
themselves.
4. Constitutional Concerns
The Sedima majority believed that, absent a prior criminal con-
viction requirement, civil RICO would be unconstitutional. The
court's concern arose from a perception that liability under section
1964(c) results in penalties which are essentially criminal in na-
228 See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 81-83 (1969). The civil remedies were
designed to compensate for the government's "relative disadvantage" at a criminal trial
due to procedural protections. House Hearings, supra note 25, at 106. Private plaintiffs
facilitate Congress's intention to strike at RICO violators.
229 See House Hearings, supra note 25, at 520 (recommendation of Rep. Steiger); id. at
548 (ABA recommendation for "provision authorizing private damage suits based upon
the concept of Section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act").
230 See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (private right of action under Clayton Act). In fact, Congress
intended that RICO be interpreted less restrictively than the antitrust laws. See supra
notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
231 116 CONG. REc. 18,940 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan). RICO's immedi-
ate predecessor bill, S. 1861, defined "racketeering activity" as "any act involving the
danger of violence to life, limb, or property, indictable under State or Federal law, and
punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year." S. REP. No. 612, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 121 (1969). The Department of Justice thought this definition was "too broad"
and would "tend toward a complete federalization of criminal justice." Id. at 121-22.
The definition was therefore altered to list specific state offenses. Id. The original broad
definition shows that Congress was not concerned with prior convictions on specific
predicate acts and that these acts were listed primarily for definitional purposes.
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ture.23 2 The court's perception arose from two factors: the stigma
associated with being labelled a "racketeer" and the punitive nature
of the treble damages provision. 233 According to the court, both of
these perceived penalties arise under RICO after a finding that the
defendant has committed the predicate criminal acts. Thus the
court argued that RICO liability, and its penalties, do not operate
absent a prior finding of criminal conduct, requiring proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Absent the prior conviction requirement, a court
hearing a civil case could find the predicate acts using a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard. The court could impose the penal-
ties of stigma and treble damages without determining their
predicates under a proper burden of proof. The Sedima court be-
lieved that this was unconstitutional. 23 4 The court rejected impos-
ing a heightened burden of proof in the civil context because of the
possibility of jury confusion.2 35 These perceived constitutional and
practical difficulties led the majority to conclude that Congress
"would have explicitly required previously established convictions"
if it had considered the problem. 236
The Sedima majority was mistaken in its belief that civil RICO
imposes penalties that are primarily criminal in nature. In his dis-
senting opinion, Judge Cardamone rebutted the majority's argu-
ment that the stigma associated with being labelled a racketeer
made the statute criminal in nature. He stated that "stigma alone
ordinarily does not suffice to convert a proceeding from civil to
232 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 501. The Sedima majority created "burden of proof
problems" by arguing that, absent a prior conviction requirement, civil RICO would
improperly require the court to make criminal judgments using a civil burden of proof.
See id. at 499-502; see also supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text. These are really
"problems" only if one accepts that tivil RICO is a criminal statute, which it is not. See
supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text; infra notes 237-62 and accompanying text.
Thus a normal preponderance of the evidence standard applies throughout the trial.
Several courts have accepted this conclusion. See, e.g., Haroco, 747 F.2d at 404; Schacht
v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1352-53 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 U.S. 508 (1983); Eaby v.
Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 133-34 (E.D. Pa. 1983); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 675-77 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Parnes v. Heinhold Com-
modities, 487 F. Supp. 645, 745 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage
Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978).
233 See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 500 n.49. The majority also cited the nature of the under-
lying offense, the intent of Congress, and whether the government or a private party is
bringing the action as factors supporting its characterization of RICO. Id. The majority
emphasized the two factors discussed in the text. Id. at 503.
234 Id. at 501-02.
235 Id. at 502.
236 Id. at 501. The majority relied on language in a law review article to the effect
that Congress intended RICO to reach conduct "already criminal." Blakey & Gettings,
supra note 26, at 1023. In the context of the article this phrase referred to conduct
"already punishable under another criminal law." The same article states that "RICO is
not a criminal statute." Id. at 1021 n.71.
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criminal." 2 7 One commentator has pointed out that "RICO claims
can stigmatize defendants only if courts restrict the applicability of
the broad statutory language to proven organized criminals." 238 In
limiting RICO's application to "mobsters," the Sedima majority has
thus exacerbated the stigma which it decried. The Sedima majority
seems to have forgotten that a civil RICO defendant cannot be la-
belled a "racketeer" until the plaintiff proves the underlying acts of
fraud. The defendant held liable under RICO is not "innocent." As
the Seventh Circuit panel in Haroco pointed out, the white collar
crimes typically alleged in civil RICO complaints are "at least as dis-
turbing as the bringing of RICO claims against 'legitimate and
respected defendants.' ",239 The court should accord no more def-
erence to a business person than to any other wrongdoer. 240
The Sedima court's argument based on the punitive nature of
the treble damages provision is also unconvincing; the provision is
not inherently a criminal sanction. The Supreme Court recently re-
viewed the Clayton Act's treble damages provision in Blue Shield of
Virginia v. McCready.24 1 In McCready, the Court held that Congress's
" 'expansive remedial purpose'" in enacting section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act was "to create a private enforcement mechanism that would
deter violators and deprive them of the fruits of their illegal actions,
and would provide ample compensation to the victims of antitrust
violations." 242 Although the courts should not fetter RICO with an-
titrust standing limitations, the Court's holding in McCready demon-
strates that treble damages need not be considered exclusively
punitive. Furthermore, the Second Circuit did not claim in Sedima
that the civil action under the Clayton Act is criminal in nature, even
though its remedy is identical to that of civil RICO. The Supreme
Court has also held that certain other multiple damages provisions
237 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 508 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (citing Ullman v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956)). The Supreme Court in Turkette considered the stigma ar-
gument but apparently did not find it compelling. See supra note 94 and accompanying
text.
238 Note, supra note 159 at 1107.
239 Haroco, 747 F.2d at 395 n. 14. The Haroco court also addressed the Sedima major-
ity's argument that civil RICO has an inordinate in terrorem settlement value. See 741
F.2d at 487. In Haroco, the Seventh Circuit noted the "other side of the scales"; RICO
plaintiffs with valid claims may be able to obtain settlements closer to the actual value of
those claims. 747 F.2d at 399 n.16. The Haroco court concluded that Congress must
make the choice between simple compensatory and treble damages. Id.
240 As the panel in Furman v. Cirrito noted, "fraud is fraud, whether it is committed
by a hit man for organized crime or by the president of a Wall Street brokerage firm."
741 F.2d 524, 529 (2d Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Oct. 15,
1984) (No. 84-604).
241 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
242 Id. at 472.
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are compensatory in nature.243 The fact that a treble damages pro-
vision appears in a statute also providing for criminal remedies does
not render that provision criminal.244
The two-level test the Supreme Court promulgated in United
States v. Ward245 supports the conclusion that the private RICO ac-
tion is not "criminal" in nature. Judge Cardamone applied the test
in his Sedima dissent. He examined, first, whether Congress indi-
cated a preference for a civil or criminal label,246 and, second, if the
label was "civil," whether the statutory scheme was so punitive in
purpose or effect as to negate that intention. 247 He correctly found
that Congress had labelled the private RICO action as civil and that
civil RICO was not primarily punitive. 248 Several factors support
Judge Cardamone's conclusions.
The private RICO action satisfies the Ward test's first prong.
Congress clearly indicated that private RICO is civil rather than
criminal. The Senate Report accompanying RICO stated that "Title
IX, it must again be emphasized, is remedial rather than penal. '249
Although the Report also noted that "[p]unishment as such is lim-
ited to the criminal remedies," 250 the House placed the treble dam-
ages within RICO's civil provision. The statute directs that "[t]he
provisions of this title. . . shall be liberally construed to effectuate
its remedial purpose."251 Thus Congress placed the civil damages
provision within a statutory provision labelled as remedial.
Civil RICO also satisifes the second prong of the Ward test.
Civil RICO is not so punitive as to negate Congress's intent that it
243 See, e.g., United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 314 (1976) (" 'The device of
double damages plus a specific sum was chosen to make sure that the government would
be made completely whole.' ") (quoting United States ar rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S.
537, 551-52 (1943)).
244 See United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974) ("acts which
may be prohibited by Congress may be made the subject of both criminal and civil pro-
ceedings"), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); see also Marcus, 317 U.S. at 550.
245 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980). The defendant in Ward had been fined $500 under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The Court found that the statute enacted a
"civil penalty" and did not implicate the procedural protections involved in criminal
prosecutions.
246 See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 505 (Cardamone, J., dissenting); see also Ward, 448 U.S. at
248 (setting forth test's first prong).
247 See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 505-06 (CardamoneJ., dissenting); see also Ward, 448 U.S.
at 248-49 (setting forth test's second prong).
248 See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 505-06 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
249 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1969). The bill did not contain the
treble damages remedy at that time. The report also stated that "[h]owever remedies
may be fashioned, it is necessary to free the channels of commerce from predatory activ-
ities, but there is no intent to visit punishment on any individual; the purpose is civil."
Id. at 81. Treble damages was one of the remedies eventually fashioned.
250 Id.
251 18 U.S.C. § 1961 note (1982) (liberal construction provision). See generally Note,
supra note 184 (discussing significance of RICO's liberal construction clause).
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be considered a civil statute. The Supreme Court has found that "a
statute has been considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not
to punish, but to accomplish some other legitimate governmental
purpose." 252 Congress listed such legitimate purposes as underly-
ing civil RICO, including promotion of free enterprise, domestic se-
curity, and the general welfare. 253 In addition, the Ward case
demonstrates that a monetary "penalty" need not be considered
criminal in nature.254 A monetary penalty may be analogous to civil
damages. 255
In Ward, the Court considered an earlier case, Kennedy v. Men-
doza-Martinez,256 in which it set forth seven factors to be considered
in evaluating whether a statute is criminal in nature.257 Only one
factor (whether the behavior to which the sanction applies is already
a crime) might apply to civil RICO. 258 The Court held that the pres-
ence of this single factor was insufficient to make the statute under
consideration in Ward so punitive as to be criminal in the absence of
any expressed congressional intention.259 Courts should reach the
same result when interpreting civil RICO.
Because civil RICO is not a criminal statute in that it does not
impose criminal penalties, 260 a civil burden of proof is appropriate
in evaluating the presence of the predicate acts. 261 Neither RICO's
plain language nor its legislative history supports the prior criminal
conviction requirement imposed in Sedima. Because civil RICO does
not impose penalties of a criminal nature, constitutional protections
252 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958) (citations omitted).
253 18 U.S.C. § 1961 note (1982) (Statement of Findings and Purposes).
254 The $500 fine levied for oil spillage in Ward was not a "damages" remedy.
255 See Ward, 448 U.S. at 254; see also id. at 256 (Blackmun,J., concurring) ("monetary
assessments are traditionally a form of civil remedy").
256 372 U.S. 144 (1962).
257 The factors are the following:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence,
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable
for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative pur-
pose assigned ....
Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
258 Justice Blackmun, concurring in Ward, stated that "a monetary penalty. . . does
not result in the imposition of an 'affirmative disability or restraint' within the meaning
of Mendoza-Martinez." 448 U.S. at 256. Judge Cardamone, dissenting in Sedima, agreed
that "[t]reble damages have been part of our jurisprudence for centuries . . . and they
have never been viewed as 'criminal' sanctions." Sedima, 741 F.2d at 506.
259 See 448 U.S. at 254.
260 See supra 232-59 and accompanying text.
261 Courts approving a civil burden of proof include Haroco, 747 F.2d at 404,
Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1352-53 (7th Cir. 1983). See supra note 232.
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such as the reasonable doubt standard are unnecessary. 262 Con-
gress's intent in enacting civil RICO was to facilitate the broad re-
medial aims of that Act without implicating constitutional
protections mandated in criminal proceedings. The court's decision
in Sedima to impose a prior criminal conviction requirement thus im-
properly abrogates congressional intent and should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Haroco to leave civil RICO re-
strictions to Congress accords with RICO's plain language and
broad legislative intent. The federal judiciary should not restrict a
statute whose plain language directs a sweeping attack at deeply en-
trenched economic and societal ills.263 In contrast, the racketeering
injury requirement imposed in Sedima has reintroduced the baggage
of the antitrust and organized crime nexus standing limitations to
eviscerate civil RICO. In addition, the Sedima court read nonexis-
tent ambiguities into RICO's language and disregarded the civil la-
bel on the private treble damages action in imposing a criminal
conviction requirement. The Supreme Court should therefore re-
ject the Second Circuit's reasoning in Sedima. As the Court held in
Turkette, the "language of the statute. . . [is] the most reliable evi-
dence of its intent." 264 Until Congress clearly manifests a contrary
intent,265 civil RICO's broad language should control the scope of
its availability.
Robert Taylor Hawkes
262 See Ward, 448 U.S. at 248 (various constitutional protections, including reason-
able doubt standard, are limited to context of criminal cases).
263 Commentators generally favor less restrictive readings of civil RICO. See, e.g.,
Blakey & Gettings, supra note 26; Note, supra note 159, at 1120-21 (criticizing imposition
of undue standing requirement by courts and suggesting that "[o]nly section 1962(a),
which prohibits the subsequent investment of income derived from a pattern of racke-
teering activity, should not be available to direct victims of the predicate offenses");
Comment, Putting a Halt to Judicial Limitations on Civil RICO, 52 UMKC L. REv. 56, 71
(1983) ("[j]udicial limitations on RICO are prompted by goals inconsistent with those of
Congress," for example, preventing overlap of state and federal remedies, and prevent-
ing use of RICO against non-organized crime defendants); Comment, Civil RICO: Plead-
ing Fraud for Treble Damages, 45 MoNT. L. REv. 87, 111 (1984) (In order to control
frivolous suits, "courts should impose existing civil sanctions rather than change the
substantive law."); Note, supra note 100, at 437 ("Congress and the courts are left with
the options of having either a powerful anti-organized crime weapon that is equally ef-
fective against legitimate businesses or restricting the application of RICO so that its
powerful provisions fall on only those involved with organized crime. . . . [T]he latter
[may be] impossible to achieve.").
264 452 U.S. at 593.
265 Congress could easily amend civil RICO if it so desired by either limiting the
very broad definition of a "pattern of racketeering activity" in § 1961(5) or by adding a
specific requirement of causation in place of the "by reason of' language in § 1964(c).
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